Review of On China by Henry Kissinger
My personal copy of On China.
Category: Non-fiction, history, international diplomacy, memoir
Page Count: 548 (Paperback Edition)
Year of Publication: 2012
Rating: 5/5
10-Word Summary: An exploration of Chinese history and diplomacy with the West.
About On China
I think the people at Penguin Books had to title the book On China because there was no other suitable name for the book. It doesn’t fit neatly into any one category of literary genre because it’s many things. For the first four chapters, the book is a history of China that rushes through the early history of Chinese civilization to get to the all-important 19th century where China is humiliated by the Western powers of the world until the decline of the Qing Dynasty and the revolution of Mao Zedong.
Chapters five through seven begin the book’s focus on diplomacy between China, the Soviet Union, and the USA, and the decade of crisis during Mao’s time as Chairman that included events such as the Great Leap Forward, the 1962 Sino-Indian War, and the Cultural Revolution.
But it’s chapters eight through seventeen where the book also becomes memoir. Chapters eight through eleven are the time period where Dr. Kissinger is serving as then American President Richard Nixon’s Secretary of State, and Kissinger makes public the thought process that went into opening up relations with Communist China as well as the conversations had between himself and Mao Zedong. Chapters twelve to seventeen detail the eras of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, as well as Kissinger’s conversations with those leaders, respectively.
The final two chapters, and the afterword to the paperback edition (the edition I read) give Kissinger’s insight as to what the world will look like and how the USA should act given China’s newfound role as a superpower.
What I Liked
Anyone can write a book about Chinese history and its diplomatic history with the rest of the world, but it’s unique that one can do that as a former Secretary of State with insight into the character of different Chinese leaders and the conversations had with them. Hence, my favorite part about On China is that I felt like a fly on the wall amongst some of the world’s most powerful individuals and their conversations, as the outcome of these conversations would go on to shape geopolitics until our present day.
And this is where Kissinger’s book truly shines because it’s refreshing to come across a history lesson from one who lived during the relevant time period and helped to shape it. I felt that I understood the reasoning behind why the USA decided to open up to China (in a nutshell, both felt the Soviet Union was the greater threat) behind the scenes, unlike the way one gathers information from reading a dry history textbook.
But Kissinger’s book also gave me a newfound respect for President Nixon; he was a very calculative and strategic thinker, make no mistake, and Kissinger does not shy away from expounding on President Nixon’s principles of foreign policy. However, it’s refreshing to hear it from someone who worked so closely with Nixon as opposed to someone who is writing from a distance like a journalist or an academic, as Kissinger sprinkles the book with the meetings and conversations had with Nixon prior to opening up to China.
What I Didn’t Like
Kissinger’s dry personality runs through each page, and he writes and talks in his conversations as if he is observing some sort of phenomena in a cold and calculative manner. For example, take the following excerpt from his book where Chairman Deng Xiaoping explains to Kissinger the Chinese strategy behind withdrawing troops from Vietnam:
DENG: After I came back [from the United States], we immediately fought a war. But we asked you for your opinion beforehand. I talked it over with President Carter and then he replied in a very formal and solemn way. He read a written text to me. I said to him: China will handle this question independently and if there is any risk, China will take on the risk alone. In retrospect, we think if we had driven deeper into Vietnam in our punitive action, it would have been even better.
KISSINGER: It could be.
DENG: Because our forces were sufficient to drive all the way to Hanoi. But it wouldn’t be advisable to go that far.
KISSINGER: No, it would probably have gone beyond the limits of calculation.
DENG: Yes, you’re right. But we could have driven 30 kilometers deeper into Vietnam. We occupied all the defensive areas of fortification. There wasn’t a defense line left all the way to Hanoi.
Kissinger comes off as almost robotic in this conversation, carefully choosing each word of the sentence, and much of his writing comes off in the same dry tone.
When discussing events such as Mao’s Great Leap Forward, Kissinger mentions the failed production goals and how it led to the deaths of over twenty million people. Yet, he falls short of calling Mao a failed leader or leveling any direct criticism toward him for his failed policies. I understand that Kissinger knew Mao, but that doesn’t mean he should shy away from leveling criticism toward the man when his decision led to the deaths of millions.
Should You Read On China?
If you’re looking for a book that explains the last two hundred years of Chinese history with a focus on diplomacy and international relations, then this is your book. However, given that the paperback edition was published in 2012, the book makes no mention of Xi Jinping—given that he was relatively unknown until his ascension as President in 2012—and his important transformation of China over the last eleven years. This book would be best read in combination with another book, such as Elizabeth Economy’s The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State for which a review is soon to come.
