What is Realpolitik?
My upcoming book, The Next World War?, begins with Germany, specifically the foreign policy of Otto von Bismarck. So, I spent the last three weeks reading two biographies on Bismarck. The first one was Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman by A. J. P. Taylor. This book was suggested reading in Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius’s Great Course titled War, Peace, and Power: Diplomatic History of Europe, 1500-2000, and given how much I learned from that lecture series, I knew it was a book I had to read eventually. The second book was Bismarck: A Life by Jonathan Steinberg, which was a longer, more thorough examination on how Bismarck exercised his personal power.
I always looked up to Bismarck as the greatest statesman ever—a foreign policy genius who knew exactly what political moves to make, how to calculate each move, and how each move would play out. A part of me read the books in hopes that I would understand the “secret sauce” that made him such a foreign policy genius, and I found it.
The reason why Bismarck was such a foreign policy genius was because he was a man who lacked political principles. As a matter of fact, Bismarck began his political career as a Prussian conservative. A conservative in the 1800s was one who believed in most of the following principles: first, in the obedience to the political authority of a monarch, second, in the opposition to individual rights or elected representatives for governments, third, that revolutions were a political evil, and fourth, that organized religion was crucial to order in society.
Bismarck believed in the first principle, in the political authority of King Frederick Wilhelm I. But later in his career, he did not care for the other three. It was he who introduced universal suffrage in Germany, it was he who separated church from state and replaced clerical supervision in all public and private schools with state supervision, and it he who went so far as to defend political revolution. Here is Bismarck in his own words:
How many existences are there in today’s political world that have no roots in revolutionary soil? Take Spain, Portugal, Brazil, all the American Republics, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Greece, Sweden and England which bases itself on the consciousness of the Glorious Revolution of 1688…. (Bismarck: A Life, pg. 132)
This lack of principles eventually caused many of his fellow conservatives to distance themselves from him toward the latter half of his career. And it’s this lack of principles that makes Realpolitik possible. Here is a perfect illustration of this:
When Bismarck served as Prussia's envoy to the German Confederation in Frankfurt, he wrote to his conservative friend Leopold von Gerlach that it should be in Prussia’s interest to ally with the revolutionary France of Napoleon III. For a conservative of the 1800s, an alliance with a revolutionary republic—with an “illegitimate” emperor such as Napoleon III—was nothing short of scandalous. Gerlach, representing the Prussian conservatism of the day, wrote the following to Bismarck:
My political principle is, and remains, the struggle against the Revolution. You will not convince Napoleon that he is not on the side of the Revolution. He has no desire either to be anywhere else…. You say yourself that people cannot rely upon us, and yet one cannot fail to recognize that he only is to be relied on who acts according to definite principles and not according to shifting notions of interests, and so forth. (Bismarck: A Life, pgs. 131-132)
Bismarck, being no true conservative as Gerlach hinted at above, did not make decisions by any conservative principles. As a matter of fact, allying with revolutionary France was nothing but a rational calculation, one possible chess move among many for Prussia’s rise to dominance over Austria. And in a game of chess, it’s important for the player to have as many moves open to him as possible. As Bismarck observed years later:
My entire life was spent gambling for high stakes with other people’s money. I could never foresee exactly whether my plan would succeed…. Politics is a thankless job because everything depends on chance and conjecture. One has to reckon with a series of probabilities and improbabilities and base one’s plans upon this reckoning. (Bismarck: A Life, pg. 130)
This kind of cold, rational calculation lies at the heart of Bismarck’s Realpolitik, which has “nothing to do with good and evil, virtue and vice; it had to do with power and self-interest.” (Bismarck: A Life, pg. 130) The power of Prussia and the self-interest of Prussia is, in a nutshell, is how Bismarck conducted his foreign policy. And France was just one chess move among many to increase the power of Prussia and to destroy the power of Austria. As Bismarck wrote to Gerlach:
You begin with the assumption that I sacrifice my principles to an individual who impresses me. I reject both the first and the second phrase in that sentence. The man does not impress me at all…. France only interests me as it affects the situation of my Fatherland, and we can only make our policy with the France that exists…. Sympathies and antipathies with regard to foreign powers and persons I cannot reconcile with my concept of duty in the foreign service of my country, neither in myself nor in others…. As long as each of us believes that a part of the chess board is closed to us by our own choice or that we have an arm tied where others can use both arms to our disadvantage, they will make use of our kindness without fear and without thanks. (Bismarck: A Life, pg. 131)
This is Realpolitik. Whereas a conservative guided by conservative principles would not ally with France, thereby closing a space in a game of chess that would otherwise be open to him, a man who lacks principles has this space open as a possibility, thereby making him a more versatile and dangerous player in the international system.